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The aim of this paper is to trace a map of Italian local social capital endowments. 
It focuses on the “structural” dimension of the concept, as identified with social 
networks. The analysis is based on a dataset collected by the author including 
about two hundred indicators of five main social capital dimensions: strong family 
ties, weak informal ties, voluntary organizations, civic awareness, and political 
participation. 51 key variables are selected for performing principal component 
analyses both on each of the five groups and on the entire dataset, in order to build 
latent indicators for every single social capital’s dimension and for the concept as 
a whole. Finally, a multiple factor analysis is run on the entire dataset, in search of 
a single synthetic measure of social capital. A clear distinction emerges between 
bonding  social  capital,  shaped  by  strong  family  ties,  and  bridging and  linking 
social capital, shaped by weak ties among friends, neighboors and members in 
voluntary  organizations.  Areas  characterized  by  high  levels  of  bonding  social 
capital can suffer from a lack of bridging and linking ties. The study provides a 
valuable synthetic indicator capturing the particular configuration of social capital 
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1. Introduction  
Social capital represents one of the most popular metaphors in the current social science debate. 
Since  the  publication  of  the  study  on  the  Italian  regions  carried  out  by  Putnam,  Leonardi  and 
Nanetti  in  1993,  the  Italian  case  is  particularly  popular  in  the  literature  on  cultural  and  social 
structural factors of economic growth. This study identified the core component of social capital 
with civil society associations, which prospered, along with democracy and economic growth, in the 
Northern regions as opposed to the South. 
The aim of this paper is to map Italian local social capital’s endowments again, attempting to take 
into the appropriate account new insights provided by theoretical and empirical research during the 
last decade. The analysis focuses on the “structural” components of social capital, which are here 
identified with social networks. Following Fukuyama (1999), and differently from great part of the 
empirical literature, this paper considers trust as as an epiphenomenon, arising as a result of social 
capital, and not constituting social capital itself. This assumption is due to the wide heterogeneity of 
social networks, which, according to their nature and scope, can in turn nurture or hamper human, 
social, and economic development.  
The study is based on a dataset collected by the author including about two hundred indicators of 
five main social capital dimensions: strong family ties, weak informal ties, voluntary organizations, 
civic  awareness,  and  political  participation.  Rough  data  are  drawn  from  a  set  of  multipurpose 
surveys carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) on a sample of 20 thousand 
households between 1998 and 2002. This paper selects 51 key variables, and performs principal 
component analyses both on each of the five groups and on the entire dataset, in order to build 
latent indicators for every single social capital’s dimension and for the concept as a whole. Finally, 
a multiple factor analysis is run on the entire dataset, in search of a single synthetic measure of 
social capital. The main findings of the empirical analysis can be summarized as follows: a clear 
distinction between two types of networks emerges. The former is shaped by strong family ties, and 
corresponds to what the theoretical literature generally calls bonding social capital. The latter is 
shaped both by weak ties among friends and neighboors and by formal ties linking together people 
coming from different social backgrounds within the boundaries of voluntary organizations. Such 
networks, corresponding to what the literature often terms “bridging” and “linking” social capital, 
tend to juxtapose each other in the Italian regions.  
Regional endowments of the two types of social capital reveal very different. Areas characterized by 
higher levels of bonding social capital can suffer from a lack of bridging and linking social capital.   
Even if strong ties play an important role in improving well-being, weak ties are generally more 
relevant  to  the  purposes  of  economic  development,  in  that  they  connect  people  belonging  to   4 
different  social  groups,  providing  access  to  informations  and  opportunities  that  would  not  be 
available within the narrow boundaries of familiar networks. As pointed out by Granovetter (1973), 
«No strong tie is a bridge ... Whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and 
travel greater social distance …  when passed through weak ties rather than strong» (Granovetter, 
1973, 1365-1366)
1.  
The contribution of this paper to the social capital literature is twofold. Firstly, it builds a new 
framework  for  measurement,  providing  a  single,  synthetic,  indicator  capturing  that  particular 
configuration  of  social  capital  which  the  literature  generally  associates  with  positive  economic 
outcomes. Such a measure, which I call “developmental social capital” can be adopted as a suitable 
point of departure for deeper empirical investigations on social capital’s effects in terms of growth, 
development, and well-being. Secondly, my findings suggest that, differently from what to date has 
been done by most cross-country studies, we have to be very cautios in carrying out international 
comparisons laying just on a single basic indicator (like trust levels).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two introduces the concept of social 
capital and underlines its relevance to economics through a brief survey of the literature. Section 
three  carries  out  a  critical  discussion  of  some  measurement  issues,  pointing  out  the  main 
weaknesses of the empirical literature on social capital. Section four briefly describes the work of 
Putnam,  Leonardi  and  Nanetti  (1993),  and  provides  an  outline  of  the  adopted  methodology. 
Sections  from  five  to  eight  present  the  results  of  the  empirical  investigations  carried  out, 
respectively, on each group of variables and on the entire dataset. The survey is closed by some 
concluding remarks and guidelines for further researches.  
 
2. Defining social capital and its relevance to economics 
The concept of social capital has a long intellectual history in the social sciences, but has gained 
celebrity  only  in  the  nineties,  due  to  Bourdieu’s  (1980,  1986),  Coleman’s  (1988,  1990)  and 
Putnam’s (1993, 1995) seminal studies
2. Bourdieu identifies three dimensions of capital each with 
its own relationship to the concept of class: economic, cultural and social capital. Bourdieu’s idea 
of social capital puts the emphasis on class conflicts: social relations are used to increase the 
ability of an actor to advance her interests, and social capital becomes a resource in the 
social struggles: social capital is «the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
                                                 
1 In the sociological literature, the concept of “bridge” is commonly used to describe «a line in a networks which 
provides the only path between two points» (Harary, Norman and Cartwright, 1965, 198). 
2 For a survey on social capital definitions and a brief intellectual history of the concept, see Sabatini (2004).   5 
relationships  of  mutual  acquaintance  and  recognition»  (Bourdieu  and  Wacquant,  1986,  119, 
expanded from Bourdieu, 1980, 2). Social capital thus has two components: it is, first, a resource 
that  is  connected  with  group  membership  and  social  networks.  «The  volume  of  social  capital 
possessed  by  a  given  agent  ...  depends  on  the  size  of  the  network  of  connections  that  he  can 
effectively mobilize» (Bourdieu 1986, 249). Secondly, it is a quality produced by the totality of the 
relationships between actors, rather than merely a common "quality" of the  group (Bourdieu 
1980). At the end of the 80s, Coleman gave new relevance to Bourdieu’s concept of social 
capital. According to Coleman, «Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, 
but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist in some aspect of 
social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure» (Coleman, 1988, 
98).  In  the  early  90s,  the  concept  of  social  capital  finally  became  a  central  topic  in  the  social 
sciences  debate.  In  1993,  Putnam,  Leonardi  and  Nanetti carried  out  a  famous  resarch  on  local 
government in Italy, which concluded that the performance of social and political institutions is 
powerfully influenced by citizen engagement in community affairs, or what, following Coleman, 
the authors termed “social capital”. In this context, social capital is referred to as «features of social 
life-networks, norms, and trust, that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared  objectives»  (Putnam,  1994,  1).  Like  other  forms  of  capital,  social capital  is  productive, 
making possible the achievement of certain ends, that in its absence would not be possible. But, in 
Coleman’s words, «Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in physical 
implements of production» (Coleman, 1988, 98). The use of the term “capital” is criticized by 
several authors belonging to the field of economics, in that it refers to things that can be owned. For 
example, Bowles and Gintis (2002) sustain that the term “community” would be more appropriate, 
because it «better captures the aspects of good governance that explain social capital’s popularity, 
as it focuses attention on what groups do rather than what people own» (Bowles and Gintis, 2002, 
422)
3. By “community” the authors mean a group who interact directly, frequently and in multi-
faceted ways.  
The cited perspectives on social capital are markedly different in origins and fields of application, 
but  they  all  agree  on  the  ability  of  certain  aspects  of  the  social  structure  to  generate  positive 
externalities for members of a group, who gain a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends.  
                                                 
3 This point is stressed by Arrow (1999), who sustains that “capital” is something “alienable”, that is, its ownership can 
be transferred to one person to another. According to Arrow,  it is difficult – as with human capital – to change the 
ownership of social capital. For other skeptical views on social capital, see Solow (1999), Fine (2001), Durlauf (2002), 
and Harriss (2002).   6 
According to the mainstream economic theory, social capital exerts its influence on well-being by 
affecting, positively or not, the individuals’ ability to maximize their objective functions. From this 
point of view, social capital can be considered as a particular kind of intermediate good, acting as 
an input for the production of assets entering as arguments in the agents’ utility and production 
functions (Becker, 1974, 1996). For firms, social capital improves productive capabilities. A social 
environment  rich  of  participation  opportunities,  allowing  people to  meet  frequently,  is  a  fertile 
ground for nurturing shared values and social norms of trust and reciprocity. The likelihood of 
repeated interactions among agents grows, increasing reputation’s relevance. The better diffusion of 
informations  and  the  higher  opportunity  cost  of  free-riding  make  the  agents’  behaviour  more 
foreseeable  and  causes  an  uncertainty  reduction.  Therefore,  an  increase  in  trust-based  relations 
reduces the average cost of transactions, just as an increase in physical capital reduces the average 
cost of production. (Paldam e Svendsen, 2000, Routledge e von Amsberg, 2003, Torsvik, 2000, Zak 
e Knack, 2001). At the aggregate level, this mechanism may influence the economic performance 
and the process of development, providing a credible explanation for growth differentials among 
regions  with  similar  endowments  in  terms  of  the  other  forms  of  capital  (Cole,  Mailath  and 
Postlewaite, 1992, Johnson and Temple, 1998, Temple, 2001, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004).  
 
3. The problem of measuring social capital: a critical review 
Despite the immense amount of research on it, the definition of social capital has remained elusive.  
From a historical perspective, one could argue that social capital is not a concept but a praxis, a 
code word used to federate disparate but interrelated research interests and to facilitate the cross-
fertilization of ideas across disciplinary boundaries. As pointed out by Brown and Ashman (1996), 
one of the primary benefits of the idea of social capital is that it is allowing scholars, policy makers 
and  practitioners  from  different  disciplines  to  enjoy  an  unprecedent  level  of  cooperation  and 
dialogue. While conceptual vagueness may have promoted the use of the term among the social 
sciences, it also has been an impediment to both theoretical and empirical research of phenomena in 
which social capital may play a role. On this regard it is possible to observe that the problems 
suffered by social capital empirical studies are, at some level, endemic to all empirical work in 
economics. Heckmann (2000) states that the establishment of causal relationships is intrinsically 
difficult: «Some of the disagreement that arises in interpreting a given body of data is intrinsic to 
the field of economics because of the conditional nature of causal knowledge. The information in 
any  body  of  data  is  usually  too  weak  to  eliminate  competing  causal explanations  of  the  same 
phenomenon. There is no mechanical algorithm for producing a set of “assumption free” facts or 
causal estimates based on those facts» (Heckman, 2000, 91). However, according to Durlauf (2002)   7 
«The empirical social capital literature seems to be particularly plagued by vague definition of 
concepts, poorly measured data, absence of appropriate exchangeability conditions, and lack of 
information necessary to make identification claims plausible» (Durlauf, 2002, 22). In his article, 
the author reviews three famous empirical studies, concluding that they don't help in understanding 
the  socioeconomic  outcomes  of  social  capital,  which  remain  unclear  and  to  be  demonstrated. 
However, we can argue that Durlauf's critique is one step forward in respect to the position of some 
prominent economists, who, prior to discuss the ability of the econometric analysis to investigate 
social capital’s supposed outcomes, doubt the possibility to provide credible measures of its stock, 
and question about the opportunity itself to consider the concept as an useful analytical tool for 
economics. In his critique to Fukuyama, Solow (1995) writes: «If “social capital” is to be more than 
a buzzword, something more than mere relevance or even importance is required. ... The stock of 
social capital should somehow be measurable, even inexactly» (1995, 36). As a reply, it is possible 
to observe that, during the last ten years, the empirical research has proposed a great variety of 
methods for measuring social capital and testing its ability to produce relevant social, economic, 
and  political  outcomes.  However,  the  empirics  of  social  capital  still  continue  to  suffer  from  a 
definite difficulty to address macro outcomes in a convincing way. On this regard we can identify 
two main problems.  
The first is the use of macro indicators not directly related to social capital’s key components. Such 
indicators  –  e.g.  crime  rates,  teenage  pregnancy,  blood  donation,  participation  rates  in  tertiary 
education  –  are  quite  popular  in  the  empirical  research,  but  their  use  has  led  to  considerable 
confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from its outcomes, and what the relationship 
between social capital and its outcomes may be. Research reliant upon an outcome of social capital 
as an indicator of it will necessarily find social capital to be related to that outcome. Social capital 
becomes tautologically present whenever an outcome is observed (Portes, 1998, Durlauf, 1999, 
Stone,  2001).  In  order  to  avoid  such  shortcomings,  my  study  focuses  only  on  the  “structural” 
dimensions of social capital, as identified with social networks. 
The second main problem facing the empirical literature is “aggregation”. Great part of existing 
cross-national studies on the economic outcomes of social capital is based on measures of trust 
drew from the World Values Survey. Trust measured throug surveys is a “micro” and “cognitive” 
concept, in that it represents the individuals’ perception of their social environment, related to the 
particular position that interviewed people occupy in the social structure. The aggregation of such 
data, however, creates a measure of what can be called “macro” or “social” trust which looses its 
linkage with the social and historical circumstances in which trust and social capital are located. As 
pointed out by Foley and Edwards (1999), empirical studies based on cross-country comparisons of   8 
trust may be a “cul de sac”, because of their inability to address macro outcomes, in view of the 
absence  of the  broader context  within which  attitudes  are created and  determined.  Fine  (2001) 
argues that «if social capital is context-dependent – and context is highly variable by how, when 
and whom, then any conclusion are themselves illegitimate as the basis for generalisation to other 
circumstances» (Fine, 2001, 105). My effort of taking into account such insights is based on the 
rejection of trust as a suitable social capital indicator and on the use of macro data on people 
effective  behavior  as  collected  by  the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics  (ISTAT)  in  its 
multipurpose surveys.  
 
4. Measuring social capital in Italy 
Since the publication of the seminal study on the Italian regions carried out by Putnam, Leonardi 
and Nanetti in 1993, the Italian case is particularly popular throughout the social sciences debate on 
cultural factors of economic growht. According to the authors, social capital endowments are highly 
persistent  over  centuries,  and  conditions  for  their  formation  lay  down  in  almost  a  millenium 
previously. In the authors’ words: «Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms and networks, tend 
to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuos circles result in social equilibria with high levels of 
cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being … Defection, distrust, 
shirking,  exploitation,  isolation,  disorder,  and  stagnation  intensify  one  another  in  a  suffocating 
miasma of vicious circles. This argument suggests that there may be at least two broad equilibria 
toward which all societies that face problems of collective action (that is all societies) tend to 
evolve and which, once attained, tend to be self-reinforcing» (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, 
177). This argument has been widely discussed in the social science debate of the 90s: «It has been 
subject to a number of what can only be described as devastating critiques, not least from scholars 
of Italian history» (Fine, 2001, 86). However, this study posed a milestone for social capital theory, 
which registered an explosive development in the following decade, rapidly involving the attention 
of economists. As pointed out by Isham, Kelly and Ramaswamy (2002), a “keyword” search in all 
journals  in EconLit,  the  most  frequently  used  database  of  references  in  economics,  shows  that 
citations for “social capital” have grown rapidly over the last decade, doubling each year since the 
late 1990s. In 2000, social capital had about a quarter of the absolute number of citations. Putnam's 
(1993) work on Italy has been pronounced by the editor of the mainstream Quarterly Journal of 
Economics as the most cited contribution across the social sciences in the 1990s (Fine, 2001, 83). 
More than ten years after Making Democracy Work, the aim of this paper is to map the Italian local 
social capital’s endowments again, attempting to take into the appropriate account new insights 
provided by social capital theory.    9 
A statistical method particularly suitable for investigating multidimensional concepts like social 
capital  is  principal  component  analysis  (PCA),  which  is  able  to  build  few  synthetic  indicators 
starting  from  a  variety  of  multiple  variables,  therefore  allowing  to “reduce”  the  complexity  of 
multifaceted phenomena. I do not want to go into the details about the computational aspects of 
PCA here, which can be found elsewhere (see for example Bolasco, 2002, Lebart, Morineau and 
Warwick,  1984,  Johnson  and  Wichern,  1992).  However,  basically,  PCA  explains  the  variance-
covariance  structure of a dataset through a few linear combinations of the original variables. Its 
general objectives are data reduction and interpretation. Although p components are required to 
reproduce the total system variablity, often much of this variability can be accounted for by a small 
number,  k,  of  the  principal  components.  If  so,  there  is  (almost)  as  much  information  in  the  k 
components as there is in the original p variables. The k principal components can then replace the 
initial p variables, and the original dataset, consisting of n measurements on p variables, is reduced 
to  one  consisting  of  n  measurements  on  k  principal  components.  An  analysis  of  principal 
components  often  reveals  “latent”  relationships  that  were  not  previously  suspected  and  thereby 
allows  interpretations  that  would  not  ordinarily  result.  Every  couple  of  selected  principal 
components creates a factorial plan, which may offer a powerful graphic representation of distances 
between analysis units. Factorial plans are particularly suitable for comparing different geographical 
areas. This approach is considered “exploratory” - as opposed to great part of the other empirical 
analyses, which constitutes confirmatory approaches - in that it explores the underlying relations 
existing in data without having the claim to explain causalities in such relations. Analysis units (e.g. 
the Italian regions) can be reclassified according to the new "composite measures" provided by 
underlying factors, and factor scores can then be used as the raw data to represent the independent 
variables in a regression, discriminant, or correlation analysis. 
The analysis is based on a dataset collected by the author including about two hundred indicators of 
five main social capital dimensions: strong family ties, weak informal ties, voluntary organizations, 
civic awareness, and political participation. Rough data are drawn from a wide set of multipurpose 
surveys carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) on a sample of 20 thousand 
of households between 1998 and 2002
4. This paper selects 49 key variables, and performs principal 
component analyses both on each of the five groups and on the entire dataset, in order to build 
latent indicators for every single social capital’s dimension and for the concept as a whole. 
 
4.1 Social capital as informal networks of strong family ties 
                                                 
4 See ISTAT (2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2003, 2004a, 2004b), cited in bibliography.   10 
The family household, as a place in which social relations characterised by trust and reciprocity 
operate, is generally referred to as a form of bonding social capital. Studies which focusing on 
social capital within a family household typically investigate the impact of social capital on a given 
family outcome – often child development or wellbeing. The work of Coleman (1988) is probably 
the  most  notable  contribution  of  this  type.  The  “strength”  of  family  relations  is  measured  by 
Coleman using a ratio of parents to children. This approach does not take into account neither the 
quality of parents-children relationships nor the importance of non-resident parents and of the other 
relatives ouside the family. In this paper, I measure family social capital through indicators of the 
family composition (e.g. COPFIG and FAMSING), of the spatial distance between family members 
(e.g. MUM1KM and FIG1KM), of the relevance of other relatives (e.g. INCPAR2S), and of the 
quality of relationships both with family members and with the other relatives (e.g. CONTPAR and 
SODDPAR). Adopted variables are described in detail in Table A1, Annex 1. Correlations are as 
expected, with the notable exception of SODDPAR, expressing people satisfaction for the quality of 
their relationships with relatives: the frequency of contacts and the spatial proximity are everywhere 
negatively correlated with the level of satisfaction. Strongly correlated variables (like COPFIG and 
COPNOFIG) are intentionally kept together in the dataset with the aim to increase the explanatory 
power of the factorial axes resulting from the PCA. The correlation matrix is reported in Table A2. 
The first principal component explains about 62 percent of the variation of the data. All factor 
loadings on the first axis are extremely high. The first principal component therefore provides a 
valuable indicator of the bonding social capital shaped by strong family ties. In particular, lower 
factor scores are associated with a higher frequency of family contacts and with a higher spatial 
proximity between family members, but also with a lower satisfaction for the quality of familiar 
relationships. It is noteworthy that the variable CONTPAR, expressing people propensity to count 
of parents in case of need, is weakly correlated with the first two axes and powerfully loads on the 
third principal component. Regions exhibiting the highest scores on the corresponding factor are 
Calabria, Sardegna, Valle d’Aosta, Umbria and Toscana, while most Central and Southern regions 
are  not  well-positioned.  The  variable  also  exhibits  weak  and  negative  correlations  with  the 
indicators of family contacts frequency and spatial proximity. The synthetic indicator provided by 
the PCA is therefore an expression of the strenght of family ties, but does not take into account their 
quality. The corresponding ranking of the Italian regions is presented in Table 1, alongside with 
cases’  absolute  contributions  and  squared  cosines.  Molise  is  treated  as  an  outlier  due  to  an 
excessively high absolute contribution to the second principal component (49,1). 
 




Table 1. Italian regions ranking based on bonding social capital endowments 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contributions  Squared cosines 
1  Campania  -5,90  16,96  0,88 
2  Puglia  -4,72  10,86  0,83 
3  Calabria  -4,36  9,25  0,71 
4  Basilicata  -3,84  7,19  0,72 
5  Sicilia  -3,37  5,54  0,59 
6  Sardegna  -2,82  3,87  0,47 
7  Umbria  -1,26  0,77  0,15 
8  Marche  -0,20  0,02  0,01 
9  Molise  -0,06  outlier  0,00 
10  Abruzzo  0,08  0,00  0,00 
11  Veneto  0,53  0,14  0,05 
12  Trentino Alto Adige  0,56  0,15  0,03 
13  Lazio  1,49  1,09  0,15 
14  Lombardia  1,65  1,32  0,41 
15  Emilia Romagna  2,65  3,42  0,65 
16  Toscana  2,67  3,47  0,62 
17  Friuli Venezia Giulia  3,15  4,83  0,43 
18  Valle d'Aosta  3,76  6,89  0,57 
19  Piemonte  4,56  10,10  0,89 
20  Liguria  5,39  14,14  0,77 
 
 
Factor scores are the regions' coordinates on the first principal component. Absolute contributions 
provide essential parameters for controlling the statical model’s quality, in that they show how 
much of the variance explained by the α-th component is due to the i-th case, therefore signaling 
the presence of potential “outliers”. The absolute contribution of the i-th case to the α component is 




















where  () i c!  is the score of region i on the α-th factor, weights pi are uniform in all the PCAs 
performed in this paper - in order to give the same importance to the statistical units and to highlight 
differences among regions -  and  ! "  is the eigenvalue corresponding to the α-th component. If the 
element i explains too much of a factor’s variance, the factorial model is “conditioned” by that 
element, therefore loosing its reliability. When this is the case, element i must be treated as an   12 
outlier. Squared cosines are the relative contribution of the α-th factor to the explanation of each 
unit’s variance. They therefore constitute the representation quality (RQ) of the i-th element on the 
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where k is the number of significant eigenvalues λ considered in the analysis,  ! " # , i x  is the angle 
shaped by i-th case’s vector and the α-th factor. An high squared cosine means that the α-th factor 
is powerfully able to explain the i-th case. 
Campania  exhibits  the  highest  score,  and,  more  in  general,  Southern  regions  register  higher 
endowments  of  bonding  social  capital.  It  is  noteworthy  observing  that  negative  scores  do  not 
correspond to negative endowments of bonding social capital, in that the classification is merely 
“comparative”  and  based  on  a  latent,  unobservable,  variable  (the  first  principal  component), 
obtained as a result of a linear combination of the multiple variables composing the initial dataset. 
At  the  bottom  of  the  ranking,  a  case  for  Liguria  clearly  emerges.  According  to  the  original 
measurement carried out by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), Liguria was one of the most 
healthy Italian regions. My rankings show that not only this region is particularly poor of bonding 
social  capital,  but also  that  its  endowments  of  bridging  and linking  social capital  have  rapidly 
worsened during last ten years. The destruction of family social capital in Liguria may be explained 
as a consequence of a strong process of population aging. The annual natural increase (the surplus 
of births over deaths) is negative since 1970. The birth rate is actually the lowest in Italy, and the 
death  rate  is the  highest.  The  international  migration  balance  is  positive and contributes to the 
increase of the social structure’s heterogeneity (Istat, 2004c), while the divorce rate is among the 
highest (Istat, 2004d).  
 
4.2  Social capital as informal networks of weak ties 
Putnam’s (1995) study on American civil society drew a distinction between the different types of 
social  networks  likely  to  support  social  capital.  Putnam  identified  neighbourhood  networks  – 
something he described as “good neighbourliness” – as promoting social capital. In contrast, the 
leisure activity of bowling alone, rather than in an organised club activity, is presented by Putnam 
as evidence of “social disengagement”. Since Putnam’s (1995) analysis, a number of studies have 
measured  networks  of  friends,  neighbours  and  acquaintances  somewhat  more  precisely.  In  this   13 
paper I focus on several indicators of people social engagement or, in other terms, of what can be 
referred  to  as  “relational  goods”,  like  ASSPORT  and  BAR2S.  According  to  great  part  of  the 
literature,  social  capital  is  accumulated  not  only  through  standard  mechanisms  of  individual 
investments,  but  also  as  a  result  of  the  simultaneous  production and  consumption  of  relational 
goods taking place in the context of different kinds of social participation. It is noteworthy that the 
relationship between (production and consumption of) relational goods and the accumulation of 
social capital has a double direction. On one side, a higher social capital increases the returns to the 
time spent in social participation. For instance, it is easier and more rewarding going out with 
friends  in  a  context  that  offers  many  options  for  socially  enjoyed  leisure  (e.g.  MUBAR  and 
CENAF2S). In other words, social capital may be seen as an improvement in the technology of 
production of relational goods. On the other side, a higher social participation brings about social 
capital  accumulation  as  a  byproduct.  For  instance,  trust  (or  empathy)  may  be  reinforced  and 
generalized  through  social  interactions.  Adopted  variables  are  described  in  Table  A3,  and  the 
correlation matrix is reported in Table A3. A PCA on this dataset provides a synthetic indicator for 
regional endowments of informal social networks of friends, which are generally referred to as 
bridging social capital by great part of the literature. The first two principal components explain 
about  70  percent  of  the  variation  of  the  data  and  the  first  axis  powerfully  represents  positive 
endowments of bridging social capital, exhibiting high absolute values of correlations with all the 























Table 2. Italian regions ranking based on bridging social capital endowments 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contributions  Squared cosines 
1  Piemonte  -0,36  0,11  0,05 
2  Valle d'Aosta  -3,35  9,70  0,79 
3  Lombardia  -0,93  0,74  0,12 
4  Trentino Alto Adige  -4,34  16,23  0,72 
5  Veneto  -2,71  6,33  0,56 
6  Friuli Venezia Giulia  -2,21  4,22  0,69 
7  Liguria  1,36  1,59  0,43 
8  Emilia Romagna  -2,69  6,24  0,60 
9  Toscana  -1,30  1,46  0,33 
10  Umbria  -0,61  0,32  0,11 
11  Marche  -1,69  2,46  0,51 
12  Lazio  1,64  2,33  0,35 
13  Abruzzo  1,00  0,87  0,39 
14  Molise  0,24  0,05  0,01 
15  Campania  3,93  13,31  0,85 
16  Puglia  3,91  13,16  0,67 
17  Basilicata  1,43  1,75  0,11 
18  Calabria  2,94  7,44  0,68 
19  Sicilia  3,68  11,69  0,62 





The quality of representation of the first axis, as it is shown by squared cosines, is particularly low 
for Piemonte, Umbria, Molise and Basilicata, and is null for Sardegna. Absolute contributions are 
satisfactorily  homogeneous.  The  first  principal  component  provides  a  synthetic  indicator  of  the 
bridging social capital given by weak ties connecting friends and acquaintances. Lower scores are 
associated with a higher level of contacts with other people in informal contexts like sport circles, 
bars, restaurants and music clubs, and also, but more weakly, with a higher propensity to talk with 
neighboors.  Campania  lies  now  at  the  bottom  of  the  ranking,  together  with the  other  Southern 
regions. The better endowed region is Trentino Alto Adige, while the case for Liguria is confirmed, 
in that this region appears as the poorest in Central and Northern Italy with respect to bridging 
social capital. 
 
4.3  Social capital as voluntary organizations 
Following  Putnam  (1993,  1995),  great part  of  the  literature  has  used  membership  in  voluntary 
associations as an indicator of social capital, assuming that such groups and associations function as 
“schools of democracy”, in which cooperative values and trust are easily socialized. In this paper, 
the density of voluntary organizations is measured through ORGANIZ. The degree of members 
involvement in  the  association’s  life  is measured through  AIUTOVOL,  RIUASCU,  RIUASEC, 
SOLDASS  and  AMIVOL.  Adopted  variables  are  described  in  detail  in  Table  A5,  and  the 
correlation matrix is presented in Table A6. The PCA allows us to build a synthetic indicator for the 
linking social capital of voluntary organizations. The first principal component explains about 67 
percent of the variation of the data, while the first factorial plan explains about 84 percent. Lower 
regions’ scores on the first axis are associated with a higher propensity to join meetings and funding 
associations and also, but more weakly, with the propensity to carry out volunteering activities, as 
expressed by AIUTOVOL. This variable more powerfully loads on the second principal component. 
This suggests that civil society is a complex phenomenon with at least two major dimensions. The 
first  one  is  shaped  by  people  propensity  to  carry  out  light  forms  of  participation,  like  joining 
meetings and giving money to associations. The second one is given by people propensity to carry 
out  volunteering  activities  “on  the  field”,  with  the  aim  to  give  concrete  help  to  disadvantaged 
people.  The  regional  ranking  based  on  the  first  principal  component  is  reported  in  Table  3.  It 
confirms  the  strong  polarization  between  Northern  and  Southern  Italy.  Veneto,  Friuli  Venezia 
Giulia, Toscana and Emilia Romagna lead the ranking, while Campania lies at the bottom, together   15 
with Sicilia and Puglia. Trentino Alto Adige is here treated as an outlier, due to its value for the 
variable ORGANIZ, which is particularly higher than the national average (16,6% vs. 3,2%). The 
case’s absolute contribution to the first axis would consequently reach the excessively high value of  
53,7%, slightly influencing the structure of relationships between the other variables.  
 
 
Table 3. Italian regions rankings based on participation to voluntary organizations 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contributions  Squared cosines 
1  Trentino-Alto Adige  -10,60  outlier  0,81 
2  Veneto  -3,22  15,31  0,83 
3  Toscana  -2,97  13,01  0,77 
4  Friuli Venezia Giulia  -2,03  6,07  0,47 
5  Valle d'Aosta  -1,81  4,80  0,68 
6  Emilia Romagna  -1,70  4,28  0,47 
7  Lombardia  -1,42  2,97  0,35 
8  Liguria  -0,96  1,36  0,66 
9  Marche  -0,60  0,53  0,10 
10  Piemonte  -0,36  0,19  0,03 
11  Umbria  -0,31  0,15  0,02 
12  Sardegna  0,00  0,00  0,00 
13  Molise  0,22  0,07  0,01 
14  Calabria  1,53  3,43  0,70 
15  Lazio  1,79  4,72  0,78 
16  Basilicata  1,81  4,84  0,48 
17  Abruzzo  2,13  6,66  0,91 
18  Puglia  2,21  7,21  0,83 
19  Sicilia  2,49  9,12  0,89 
20  Campania  3,22  15,28  0,98 
 
 
4.4  Social capital as active political participation 
In this paper, I have considered political parties as a particular type of formal networks which 
constitute an integral part of social capital’s definition. Adopted variables (Table A7) have been 
choosen in the attempt to capture the relational dimension of political participation (COMIZIO and 
CORTEO) and the degree of involvment in the organization’s life (ATGRAPAR and SOLDPAR). 
The first two axes account for 80,34 percent of the variance. Three variables representing more 
active political participation (COMIZIO, CORTEO and ATGRAPR) are strongly correlated with 
the first axis, while people’s propensity to fund political parties (SOLDPAR) is highly correlated 
with  the  second  axis.  Therefore,  we  can  state  that  political  participation,  as  well  as  social 
participation  through  voluntary  organizations,  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  with  at  least  two 
dimension: the first one is shaped by active forms of political participation, while the second one 
represents a lighter form of involvement. Trentino Alto Adige and Emilia Romagna are treated as 
outliers, since their joint absolute contributions to the second axis would otherwise account for 63,8   16 
percent. The first factorial plan interestingly shows that Southern regions like Calabria, Puglia and 
Molise exhibit the highest scores together with regions characterized by a deep tradition of active 
political participation like Emilia Romagna. Toscana shows particularly low squared cosines in 
respect to the first two axis, but is powerfully represented by the third principal component (with a 
quality of representation accounting for 0,89), which can be interpreted as people propensity to join 
marches (as described by the variable CORTEO) and to fund political parties (SOLDPAR). The 




A PCA on the two groups representing voluntary organizations and active political participation 
finds a weak correlation between these two types of linking social capital. The first factorial plan 
satisfactorily explains about the 71 percent of the total variation of the data. Variables describing 
active social participation have a significant negative correlation with the first axis, while indicators 
of active political participation are positively correlated with the second principal component. This 
statement  is  strenghtned  by  the  observation  of  the  correlation  circle  represented  in  Figure  1. 
Simplifying, the correlation circle shows a projection of the initial variables in the factors space. 
When two variables are far from the center, then they are significantly positively correlated if they 
are close to each other, and not correlated if they are ortogonal. If they are on the opposite side of 
the center, then they are significantly negatively correlated. When the variables are close to the 
Table 4. Italian regions ranking based on active political participation 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contribution  Squared cosines 
1  Trentino-Alto Adige  5,86  outlier  0,76 
2  Emilia Romagna  4,79  outlier  0,85 
3  Molise  2,86  21,22  0,88 
4  Calabria  2,79  20,23  0,95 
5  Puglia  2,35  14,36  0,82 
6  Basilicata  1,86  9,04  0,73 
7  Sardegna  1,04  2,79  0,58 
8  Toscana  0,26  0,17  0,01 
9  Liguria  -0,16  0,06  0,02 
10  Veneto  -0,33  0,28  0,22 
11  Piemonte  -0,60  0,93  0,16 
12  Sicilia  -0,78  1,57  0,09 
13  Abruzzo  -0,78  1,60  0,29 
14  Umbria  -0,93  2,23  0,27 
15  Lazio  -1,08  3,01  0,47 
16  Valle d'Aosta  -1,10  3,16  0,18 
17  Marche  -1,13  3,33  0,84 
18  Campania  -1,20  3,73  0,43 
19  Friuli Venezia Giulia  -1,51  5,94  0,84 
20  Lombardia  -1,56  6,36  0,85   17 
center, it means that some information is carried on other axes and that any interpretation might be 
hazardous.  In figure 1, normed eigenvectors respectively associated to active political participation 
and social participation through voluntary organizations are almost ortogonal, revealing the absence 
of a significant correlation. The only significant correlation is between SOLDASS and SOLDPAR. 
This probably indicates that people used to fund political parties have also a higher propensity to 







4.5  Social capital as civic awareness 
In Making Democracy Work, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) adopt the number of newspapers 
readers as an indicator of citizens civic engagement. The claim is that well-informed citizens have a 
better  knowledge  of  public  affairs  and  a  greater  confidence  in  their  ability  to  influence  public 
choices.  Therefore, they are more likely to be involved in collective action and public life. In his 
following  study  on  the  American  civil  society,  Putnam  (2000)  found  that  people  who  read 
newspapers regularly belong to and participate more fully in a greater number of organizations and 
civic associations, are more likely to vote, volunteer more frequently for community projects, visit 
friends more frequently, and build stronger trusting relationships with their neighbors. In this paper, 
I have considered indicators of people propensity to keep themselves informed on public affairs as   18 
separated from social capital indicators, with the aim to distinguish this manifestation of civicness 
from the structural dimensions of social capital, as given by social networks. However, a small 
dataset  including  indicators  of  “non-active  civic  engagement”  is  used  in  a  PCA  for  building 
synthetic indicator of this “cognitive” dimension of social capital, in order to test Putnam’s claim 
and to carry out interesting comparisons. Adopted variables are described in Table A10. The first 
two axes satisfactorily explain about 85 percent of the total variation of the data. Negative civic 
awareness loads powerfully on the first axis. Emilia Romagna leads the hypothetical classification 
based  on  the  synthetic  indicator  of  civic  awareness,  followed  by  Trentino-Alto  Adige,  Friuli 
Venezia Giulia and Toscana. Campania lies at the bottom, accompanied by the other Southern 
regions.  The corresponding Italian regions ranking is presented in Table A11. 
To test Putnam’s claim about the role of civic awareness in the accumulation of social capital, a 
PCA  is  run  on  a  complex  dataset  including  indicators  of  civic  engagement  through  voluntary 
organizations and of civic awareness. The correlation circle (Figure 2), points out a significant 
positive correlation between people practice to keep themselves informed and the propensity to be 
involved in voluntary organizations activities. In particular, eigenvectors representing the use to 
read  newspaper  everyday  (QUOTTG)  and  the  propensity  to  fund  voluntary  organizations 
(SOLDASS)  are  almost  laid  one  upon  the  other,  revealing  a  strong  correlation  between  the 
corresponding variables. The correlation matrix is presented in Table A12. 
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5. The empirical analysis on the entire dataset. A measure of “developmental social capital” 
A PCA on the whole dataset representing the five dimensions of social capital is then run in search 
of a couple of suitable synthetic indicators for regional endowments. The dataset has been enriched 
with  the  addition  of  indicators  of  people  engagement  in  religious  practices  (SIPRAREL  and 
NOPRAREL) which, following Putnam (1995), can be considered as proxies for bonding social 
capital. Due to the excessively high contribution to the second axis (48,2), Trentino Alto Adige has 
been kept out of the analysis. The first axis explains 47,94 of the variance of the entire dataset. An 
overview to factor loadings (Table A13) shows that higher scores on the first axis are associated 
with lower levels of bonding social capital, a higher quality of family relationships (summarized by 
variables like SODDPAR and CONTPAR), higher levels of the bridging social capital shaped by 
weak  ties  among  friends,  higher  levels  of  the  linking  social  capital  shaped  by  ties  connecting 
members in voluntary associations, lower levels of participation to religious practices, and higher 
levels  of  civic  awareness.  In  other  terms,  the  first  principal  components  provides  a  powerful, 
synthetic, indicator of that particular configuration of social capital which the literature generally 
associates with positive economic outcomes. We could label this measure as “developmental social 
capital”. The interpretation of the second axis is quite more complicated. Factor loadings are not 
particularly high, and it is possible to observe weakly negative correlations between the second 
principal component and all of the five dimensions of social capital. In the scattergram representing 
the Italian regions, however, the vertical simmetry has been inverted, in order to allow a more 
intuitive  interpretation  of  the  graph.  Therefore,  even  if  the  second  principal  component  can 
represent a generic lack of bonding and bridging social capital, the vertical axis, after the 180° 
rotation, has been named “mix of bonding and bridging ties” to the seek of brevity.  
The analysis points out also a positive correlation between weak ties (e.g. the habit to meet friends 
in informal contexts like sport circles, bars, and music clubs) and the linking ties of voluntary 
organizations. A strong correlation emerges also between strong family ties and a scarce interest in 
politics and collective affairs. Higher levels of religious participation are strongly correlated with 
the presence of bonding social capital and with a scarce interest in politics and civic affairs, while 
bridging and linking ties show a significant correlation with a low religious participation. This 
confirms Putnam’s (1995) interpretation of the catholic church as a particular form of bonding 
social capital, which does not create mutuality and equality of participation, and does not have the 
same effect as membership in social capital-rich groups.    20 
The  scattergram  (Figure  3)  highlights  the  usual  polarization  between  Northern  and  Southern 
regions. Emilia Romagna and Campania lie on the opposite sides of the scale representing the 
overall endowments of developmental social capital. 
 
 
The  corresponding  classification  is  summarized  in  Table  5,  which  includes  also  Trentino  Alto 
Adige (not represented on the scattergram).   
 
Table 5. Ranking of the Italian regions based on developmental social capital   
PCA on the entire dataset 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contributions  Squared cosines 
1  Trentino Alto Adige  8,25  outlier  0,30 
2  Emilia Romagna  6,40  8,99  0,57 
3  Friuli Venezia Giulia  5,76  7,30  0,57 
4  Valle d'Aosta  5,62  6,94  0,53 
5  Toscana  5,30  6,16  0,58 
6  Liguria  5,02  5,53  0,41 
7  Veneto  3,95  3,42  0,36 
8  Piemonte  3,72  3,04  0,42 
9  Lombardia  3,30  2,39  0,38 
10  Lazio  0,84  0,16  0,02 
11  Marche  0,68  0,10  0,02 
12  Umbria  -0,27  0,02  0,00 
13  Sardegna  -0,71  0,11  0,01 
14  Abruzzo  -2,39  1,25  0,27 
15  Molise  -2,81  1,74  0,13 
16  Basilicata  -5,86  7,54  0,54 
17  Sicilia  -6,45  9,12  0,63 
18  Puglia  -6,79  10,12  0,66 
19  Calabria  -6,83  10,24  0,73 
20  Campania  -8,49  15,84  0,82 
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Finally, a PCA is run on the four “structural” groups of data. The precedent analysis’ outcomes are 
substantially  confirmed,  with  few  minor  exceptions.  The  final  ranking  is  reported  in  Table  6. 
Trentino Alto Adige is considered out of the analysis (its absolute contribution to the second axis 
would otherwise have accounted for 48,4 percent).  
 
 
Table 6. Ranking of the Italian regions based developmental social capital 
PCA on the four structural dimensions 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contributions  Squared cosines 
1  Trentino Alto Adige  7,44  outlier  0,26 
2  Valle d'Aosta  5,88  10,27  0,66 
3  Emilia Romagna  5,05  7,56  0,49 
4  Friuli Venezia Giulia  4,66  6,44  0,50 
5  Toscana  4,42  5,78  0,54 
6  Liguria  3,96  4,65  0,32 
7  Piemonte  3,38  3,40  0,42 
8  Veneto  3,21  3,05  0,28 
9  Lombardia  2,86  2,43  0,32 
10  Marche  0,82  0,20  0,04 
11  Umbria  0,09  0,00  0,00 
12  Lazio  -0,56  0,09  0,01 
13  Abruzzo  -1,31  0,51  0,12 
14  Molise  -1,31  0,51  0,04 
15  Sardegna  -1,40  0,58  0,07 
16  Basilicata  -4,33  5,56  0,39 
17  Calabria  -5,39  8,61  0,64 
18  Sicilia  -5,56  9,16  0,59 
19  Puglia  -6,81  13,74  0,73 
20  Campania  -7,67  17,46  0,83 
 
 
The first two axes have the same meaning of those extracted through the PCA on the entire dataset, 
with  the  only  exception  given  by  the  absence  of  information  about  people  propensity  to  keep 
themselves posted on politics and public affairs. In conclusion, also the first principal component of 
this PCA can be considered as a suitable indicator of what we have termed “developmental social 
capital”,  expressing  a  combination  of  low  levels  of  bonding  social  capital  and  high  levels  of 
bridging and linking social capital.   
 
6. In search of a single synthetic indicator of social capital: a multiple factor analysis 
Finally, a multiple factor analysis (MFA) is run in search of an indicator synthetizing regional 
endowments of the four structural dimensions of social capital. Without going into theoretical and   22 
computational details (which can be found, for example, in Escofier and Pagès, 1984, and Bolasco, 
2002), MFA is a multivariate technique particularly suitable for addressing matrixes composed by a 
set  of  units  described  by  multiple  groups  of  variables.  It  studies  the  different  aspects  of  the 
multidimensional  phenomenon  by  weighting  each  group  of  characteristics  in  order  to  properly 
balance their respective relevance to the general analysis. Let X be the multiway matrix, and Xk the 
submatrixes gathering the different groups of variables. The MFA carries out a “weighted” principal 








where  k 1 !  is the highest eigenvalue resulting from the PCA performed on the k-th group. Such a 
method allows to balance each group’s role in the general analysis and provides a representation of 
considered units and variables which can be interpreted following the same criteria of the PCA. 
Once again, analysis units can be measured through new latent indicators, which are more synthetic 
than those provided by normal PCAs, in that they summarize regional endowments in terms of each 
group of variables. Factors resulting from the MFA are called “total” factors, as distinguished from 
“partial” factors resulting from normal PCAs.  
Groups labels are defined as follows: 1. strong family ties, 2. weak informal ties, 3. linking ties of 
voluntary organizations, 4. active political participation. The eigenvalues resulting from the MFA 
are reported in Table A13 and the matrix of correlations between partial factors is presented in 
Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Matrix of correlations between partial factors  
(GGFF with G = group and F = factor) 
GGFF  101  102  201  202  301  302  401  402 
101  1,0000                      
102  0,0000  1,0000                   
201  -0,6985  0,0415  1,0000                
202  -0,0980  0,5443  0,0000  1,0000             
301  -0,7429  0,1095  0,8984  0,0756  1,0000          
302  -0,0834  0,1209  -0,1595  0,3410  0,0000  1,0000       
401  0,2853  -0,2776  -0,1963  -0,3880  -0,0902  -0,2663  1,0000    
402  -0,5287  0,1853  0,7358  -0,1515  0,5595  -0,3222  0,0000  1,0000 
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Factors belonging to the same group are obviously not correlated, as they are principal components. 
Correlations’ signs are not subject to interpretation, since factors orientation is urrelevant.   
The  structure  of  relationships  between  groups  is  analysed  through  the  Lg  coefficients.  These 
indexes express the correlation between each two groups of variables, computed as the sum of 
squared covariances between each column of the k-th group and each column of the k’-th group. 
The Lg relation coefficients between groups are reported in Table 8. Coefficients are homogeneous, 
with the exception of the active political participation group. 
 
Table 8. Lg relation coefficients between groups 
   Group  1  Group  2  Group  3  Group  4  All groups 
Group  1  1,1170             
Group  2  0,6348  1,2562          
Group  3  0,6379  0,8730  1,1337       
Group  4  0,3708  0,4624  0,3269  1,3381    
All groups  0,9444  1,1038  1,0166  0,8547  1,3410 
 
 
The interpretation of the factorial plan resulting from the MFA is made observing each groups’ 
coordinates, contributions and squared cosines on the first two axes (Table 9), and active partial 
axes’ coordinates, contributions and representation quality on total facors (Table 10).  
 
Table 9. Coordinates and helps to the interpretation of the active groups 
      Coordinates  Contributions  Squared cosines 
Group  d²(Group, origin)  axis  1  axis  2  axis  1  axis  2  axis  1  axis  2 
1  1,3381  0,7793  0,1153  26,6633  8,6126  0,5438  0,0119 
2  1,3381  0,9035  0,2149  30,9116  16,0581  0,6499  0,0368 
3  1,3381  0,8704  0,1460  29,7779  10,9087  0,6682  0,0188 
4  1,3381  0,3697  0,8622  12,6472  64,4206  0,1021  0,5556 
All groups   1,0000  1,0000  0,4784  0,1701 
 
 
Table 10. Coordinates and helps to the interpretation of active partial axes                 
         Coordinates    Contributions  Squared cosines 
Groups  Partial axis  Weights  Axis   1  axis   2  axis   1  axis   2  axis   1  axis   2 
1  1,0000  0,8697  -0,0857  25,8805  0,5485  0,7565  0,0073  Group  1 
(Normal PCA)  2  0,2412  -0,1332  0,4092  0,1463  3,0186  0,0177  0,1675 
1  1,0000  -0,9459  -0,1304  30,6130  1,2706  0,8948  0,0170  Group  2  
(Normal PCA)  2  0,4477  -0,0946  0,6098  0,1371  12,4375  0,0090  0,3718 
1  1,0000  -0,9288  -0,1537  29,5131  1,7658  0,8626  0,0236  Group  3  
(Normal PCA)  2  0,2851  0,0363  0,4400  0,0129  4,1230  0,0013  0,1936 
1  1,0000  0,2890  -0,9017  2,8580  60,7508  0,0835  0,8131  Group  4 
(Normal PCA)  2  0,5324  -0,7151  -0,2943  9,3152  3,4465  0,5114  0,0866 
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The first three groups are satisfactorily represented on the first total factor. Higher scores on this 
factor correspond to higher endowments of bridging and linking social capital (i.e. groups 2 and 3) 
and, more weakly, of bonding social capital (group 1). The active political participation group is 
well represented on the second total factor. Higher scores on the corresponding axis are associated 
with higher levels of active political participation.  
Regions’ coordinates on the first axis therefore provide a nerw powerful, synthetic, measure of 
“global” endowments of social capital, representign positive endowments of all the phenomenon’s 
structural dimensions with the exception of active political participation. The corresponding ranking 
of the Italian regions is reported in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Ranking of the Italian regions based on “global social capital” 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contributions  Squared cosines 
1  Trentino Alto Adige  4,8866  outlier  0,4190 
2  Valle d'Aosta         2,3781  10,1835  0,6418 
3  Emilia Romagna        2,0958  7,9095  0,3494 
4  Veneto                1,9572  6,8973  0,5225 
5  Friuli Venezia Giulia  1,8695  6,2932  0,4613 
6  Toscana               1,7750  5,6734  0,4141 
7  Lombardia             1,3020  3,0523  0,3201 
8  Liguria               0,9894  1,7626  0,1765 
9  Piemonte              0,9519  1,6316  0,2012 
10  Marche                0,8258  1,2281  0,1991 
11  Umbria                0,5170  0,4813  0,0699 
12  Sardegna              -0,3413  0,2097  0,0245 
13  Lazio                 -0,6681  0,8036  0,0909 
14  Abruzzo               -0,7986  1,1483  0,1890 
15  Molise                -1,1963  2,5771  0,1359 
16  Basilicata            -1,7604  5,5802  0,3470 
17  Sicilia               -2,1899  8,6355  0,4870 
18  Calabria              -2,2549  9,1555  0,5811 
19  Campania              -2,6649  12,7881  0,6631 
20  Puglia                -2,7873  13,9893  0,6949 
 
 
The ranking is substantially similar to that resulting from the PCA on the four structural dimensions 
of social capital. The exceptions are due to the influence of bonding social capital on the first factor: 
Piemonte and Liguria slightly slide down and Campania leaves the last position. Trentino Alto 
Adige is treated again as an outlier (its absolute contribution to the fist axis would have been equal   25 
to 42,99) and leads the classification, followed by Valle d’Aosta, Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, Veneto and Toscana. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Overall,  the  empirical  evidence  in  this  paper  shows  a  clear  distinction  between  two  types  of 
networks.  The  former  is  shaped  by  strong  family  ties,  and  corresponds  to  what  the  theoretical 
literature  generally  calls  bonding  social  capital.  The  latter  is  shaped  both  by  weak  ties  among 
friends and neighboors and by formal ties linking together people coming from different social 
backgrounds within the boundaries of voluntary organizations. Such networks, corresponding to 
what the literature has often termed “bridging” and “linking” social capital, tend to juxtapose each 
other in the Italian regions.  
Regional endowments of the two types of social capital reveal very different. Areas characterized 
by higher levels of bonding social capital can suffer from a lack of bridging and linking social 
capital: differently from what to date has been done by most cross-country studies, we have to be 
very cautios in carrying out international comparisons laying just on a single measure (like trust 
levels).  
My analysis provides a valuable synthetic indicator capturing that particular configuration of social 
capital  which  the  literature  generally  associates  with  positive  economic  outcomes.  Particularly, 
these measure indicates low levels of bonding social capital, a good quality of family relationships, 
high levels of the bridging social capital shaped by weak ties among friends, high levels of the 
linking social capital shaped by ties connecting members in voluntary associations, and high levels 
of civic awareness. Such a measure should constitute the point of departure for a deeper empirical 
investigations on social capital’s effects in terms of economic growht, development, and well-being. 
Other interesting findings can be summarized as follows. Interest in politics and public affairs is 
found to be negatively correlated with the bonding social capital shaped by strong family ties. On 
the  contrary, the  bridging  social capital  of  weak  ties  is  generally  accompanied  by  higher civic 
awareness and participation. Active political correlation through parties is not correlated to civic 
participation through voluntary organizations, but exhibits an interesting positive relationship with 
bonding social capital. Southern regions like Molise, Calabria and Puglia are characterized by high 
levels of people involvment in political parties life which, however, do not correspond to a diffuse 
interest in politics and public affairs. Higher levels of religious participation are strongly correlated 
with the presence of bonding social capital and with a scarce interest in politics and civic affairs, 
while bridging and linking ties show a significant correlation with a low religious participation. 
This may confirm Putnam’s (1995) interpretation of the catholic church as a particular form of   26 
bonding social capital, which do not create mutuality and equality of participation, and do not have 
the same effect as membership in social capital-rich groups.  
Finally,  the  well-known  polarization  between  Northern  and  Southern  regions  is  confirmed. 
Trentino-Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta, Emilia Romagna and Toscana result as the most healthy Italian 
regions.  Although  showing  remarkable  endowments  of  bonding  family  ties,  Campania,  Puglia, 
Calabria and Sicilia exhibit a worrying poverty of bridging and linking social capital.  
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Annex A. Tables 
 
 
Table A1. Indicators of family social capital 
Label  Description  Year  Source  Mean  St. Dev
 
CONTPAR 
People aged 14 and more particularly caring relatives other than 
parents, children, grandparents and grandchildren, or counting on them 
in case of need, for every 100 people of the same area. 
1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  3,905  1,037 
COPFIG  Couples with children, for every 100 families of the same area.  2001/02  ISTAT 
(2003)  18,470  4,861 
COPNOFIG  Couples without children, for every 100 families of the same area.   2001/02  ISTAT 
(2003)  71,500  5,424 
FAM5COMP  Families with 5 components and more for every 100 families of the 
same area.  2001/02  ISTAT 
(2003)  10,990  3,995 
FAMSINGL  Singles-families for every 100 families of the same area.  2001/02  ISTAT 
(2003)  72,790  5,022 
FIG16KM 
People aged 15 and more with children living 16 kilometers away or 
more (in Italy or abroad) for every 100 families with children of the 
same area. 
1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  10,225  3,958 
FIG1KM 
People aged 15 and more with children living within 1 kilometer 
(cohabitants or not) for every 100 families with children of the same 
area. 
1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  86,245  3,594 
FRATELTG  People meeting their brothers and/or sisters everyday for every 100 
people with brothers and/or sisters of the same area.  1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  6,955  3,199 
GIOBAM2S  People aged 6 and more playing with children once a week or more for 
every 100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  32,11  2,33 
INCPARTG  People aged 6 and more meeting family members or other relatives 
everyday for every 100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  59,735  5,448 
MUM16KM 
People up to 69 having their mother living 16 kilometers away or more 
(in Italy or abroad) for every 100 people with an alive mother of the 
same area. 
1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  28,595  5,408 
MUM1KM 
People up to 69 having their mother living within 1 kilometer 
(cohabitant or not) for every 100 people with an alive mother of the 
same area. 
1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  46,055  9,139 
NOGIOBAM  People aged 6 and more never playing with children for every 100 
people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  36,22  4,19 
NOINCPA  People aged 6 and more never meeting their family members and other 
non cohabitant relatives for every 100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2000b)  10,790  4,937 
NOPARENT  People aged 6 and more having neither a family nor other non 
cohabitant relatives for every 100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2000b)  23,075  4,900 
SODDPAR  People aged 14 and more declaring themselves satisfied of 
relationships with their relatives for every 100 people of the same area.  2002  ISTAT 
(2004a)  36,27  6,34 
VFIGTG  People meeting their children everyday for every 100 people with non 
cohabitant children of the same area.  1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  43,245  4,176 
VMUMTG  People meeting their mother everyday for every 100 people with non 
cohabitant mother of the same area.  1998  ISTAT 






































































































































































SODDPAR  1,00                                                    
INCPARTG  -
0,20  1,00                                                 
NOINCPAR  0,55  -
0,42  1,00                                              
NOPARENT  0,45  0,07  0,31  1,00                                           
MUM1KM  -
0,66  0,42  -0,66  -0,56  1,00                                        
MUM16KM  0,66  -
0,39  0,62  0,45  -
0,95  1,00                                     
FIG1KM  -
0,40  0,26  -0,34  -0,60  0,79  -
0,72  1,00                                  
FIG16KM  0,26  -
0,08 




1,00                               
GIOBAM2S  -
0,55 




1,00                            
NOGIOBAM  0,67  -
0,41  0,60  0,47  -
0,84  0,77  -
0,72  0,54  -0,58  1,00                         
FAMSINGL  0,51  -
0,26  0,49  0,43  -
0,81  0,80  -
0,78  0,52  -0,63  0,60  1,00                      
FAM5COMP  -
0,71 




0,75  -0,82  -0,82  1,00                   
COPPFIG  -
0,67 




0,69  -0,91  -0,72  0,92  1,00                
COPNOFIG  0,61  -
0,29  0,45  0,55  -
0,89  0,86  -
0,81  0,72  -0,68  0,88  0,62  -0,88  -
0,98  1,00             
FRATELTG  -
0,47  0,67  -0,60  -0,43  0,86  -
0,78  0,56  -
0,29  0,50  -0,71  -0,62  0,77  0,79  -0,71  1,00          
VMUMTG  -
0,56  0,59  -0,69  -0,39  0,82  -
0,78  0,42  -
0,20  0,50  -0,63  -0,61  0,72  0,72  -0,61  0,92  1,00       
VFIGTG  -
0,18  0,14  -0,48  -0,55  0,47  -
0,41  0,50  -
0,38  0,35  -0,22  -0,64  0,51  0,34  -0,24  0,41  0,40  1,00    




0,18  -0,33  0,33  0,21  -0,36  -
0,32 
0,27  -0,13  -
0,29 
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Table A3. Indicators of the informal networks of friends and neighboors 
Label  Description  Year  Source  Mean  St.dev
 
ASSPORT  Non profit sport clubs for every 10.000 people of the same area.  2002  ISTAT 
(2002d)  11,440  4,829 
BAR2S  People aged 6 and more attending bars, pubs, and circles at least 
once a week for every 100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  21,500  4,076 
CENAF2S  People aged 6 and more having dinner outside more than once a 
week for every 100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  5,045  1,198 
INCAMI2S  People aged 6 and more meeting friends more than once a week for 
every 100 people of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  28,735  1,485 
MUBAR  People aged 14 and more attending pubs and bars to listen to music 
concerts for every 100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  18,620  2,411 
NOBAR  People aged 6 and more never attending bars, pubs and circles for 
every 100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  47,865  6,513 
NOCENF  People aged 6 and more never having dinner outside for every 100 
people of the same area. 
2000  ISAT 
(2002b)  17,265  4,954 
NOPARLCO  People aged 6 and more never talking with others for every 100 
people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  8,510  1,269 
NOPARVIC  People aged 6 and more never talking with neighboors for every 
100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  25,585  3,314 
PARCON2S  People aged 6 and more talking with others once a week or more 
for every 100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 
(2002b)  46,965  6,074 
PARVIC2S  People aged 6 and more talking with neighboors once a week or 
more for every 100 people of the same area. 
2000  ISTAT 






























































































ASSPORT  1,00                               
INCAMI2S  0,41  1,00                            
PARVIC2S  0,11  0,25  1,00                         
NOPARVIC  -0,10  -0,38  -0,72  1,00                      
PARCON2S  0,65  0,41  0,45  -0,29  1,00                   
NOPARLCO  -0,35  -0,26  -0,41  0,53  -0,74  1,00                
CENAF2S  0,65  0,35  -0,02  0,10  0,64  -0,25  1,00             
NOCENF  -0,52  -0,40  -0,10  0,14  -0,67  0,49  -0,83  1,00          
BAR2S  0,76  0,41  0,30  -0,25  0,86  -0,53  0,77  -0,66  1,00       
NOBAR  -0,74  -0,33  -0,17  0,33  -0,72  0,54  -0,66  0,66  -0,89  1,00    
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Table A5. Indicators of social capital as voluntary organizations 
Name  Description  Year  Source  Mean  St. 
Dev. 
AIUTOVOL 
People aged 14 and more who have helped strangers in the 
context of a voluntary organization’s activity, for every 100 
people of the same area.  
1998  ISTAT 
(2001)  5,080  1,407 
AMIVOL 
People aged 6 and more who, when meeting friends, carry out 
voluntary activities for every 100 people meeting friends of the 
same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004a)  3,920  1,287 
ORGANIZ  Voluntary organizations for every 10.000 people  2001  ISTAT 
(2004b)  4,195  3,284 
RIUASCU 
People aged 14 and more who have joined meetings in cultural 
circles and similar ones at least once a year for every 100 people 
of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  8,485  3,862 
RIUASEC 
People aged 14 and more who have joined meetings in ecological 
associations and similar ones at least once a year for every 100 
people of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  1,755  0,458 
SOLDASS 
People aged 14 and more who have given money to an 
association at least once a year for every 100 people of the same 
area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  15,635  6,250 
 
 
Table A6. Correlation matrix of variables representing voluntary organizatons 
   RIUASEC  RIUASCU  ORGANIZ  SOLDASS  AMIVOL  AIUTOVOL 
RIUASEC  1,00                
RIUASCU  0,56  1,00             
ORGANIZ  0,42  0,74  1,00          
SOLDASS  0,63  0,71  0,77  1,00       
AMIVOL  0,37  0,67  0,51  0,75  1,00    








Table A7. Indicators of social capital as active political participation 
Label  Description  Year  Source  Mean  St.Dev 
ATGRAPAR 
People aged 14 and more who have carried out unpaid work for a 
political party in the 12 months before the interview, for every 100 
people of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  1,500  0,365 
COMIZIO 
People aged 14 and more who have joined a political meeting in 
the 12 months before the interview, for every 100 people of the 
same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  6,025  2,698 
CORTEO 
People aged 14 and more who have joined a march in the 12 
months before the interview, for every 100 people of the same 
area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  5,700  1,525 
SOLDPAR 
People aged 14 and more who have given money to a political 
party in the 12 months before the interview, for every 100 people 
of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  2,630  1,178   34 
Table A8. Correlation matrix of variables representing active political participation 
   COMIZIO  CORTEO  ATGRAPAR  SOLDPAR 
COMIZIO  1,00          
CORTEO  0,64  1,00       
ATGRAPAR  0,64  0,40  1,00    





Table A9. Correlation matrix of the variables representing  voluntary organizations and active political participation  
   RIUASEC  RIUASCU  ORGANIZ  COMIZIO  CORTEO  ATGRAPAR  SOLDPAR  SOLDASS  AMIVOL  AIUTOVOL 
RIUASEC  1,00                            
RIUASCU  0,56  1,00                         
ORGANIZ  0,42  0,74  1,00                      
COMIZIO  0,05  -0,31  -0,32  1,00                   
CORTEO  0,35  -0,23  -0,13  0,64  1,00                
ATGRAPAR  0,19  0,07  0,31  0,57  0,44  1,00             
SOLDPAR  0,31  0,33  0,49  -0,04  0,07  0,46  1,00          
SOLDASS  0,63  0,71  0,77  -0,42  0,03  0,23  0,65  1,00       
AMIVOL  0,37  0,67  0,51  -0,73  -0,35  -0,25  0,22  0,75  1,00    









Table A10. Indicators of civic awareness 
Name  Description  Year  Source  Mean  St. Dev. 
AMIATT 
People aged 6 and more who, when meeting friends, talk 
about current affairs and share their opinion, for every 
100 people meeting friends of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004a)  27,465  4,382 
DIBATT 
People aged 14 and more having listened to a political 
debate in the 12 months before the interview, for every 
100 people of the same area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004a)  20,560  2,997 
INFOPOTG 
People aged 14 and more keeping themselves informed 
on politics everyday for every 100 people of the same 
area. 
2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  34,495  7,286 
NOINFOPO  People aged 14 and more never informing themselves on 
politics for every 100 people of the same area.  2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  26,105  7,736 
NOPARPOL  People aged 14 and more never talking about politics for 
every 100 people of the same area.   2002  ISTAT 
(2004)  36,415  7,046 
NOQUOT  People aged 11 and more not reading newspapers for 
every 100 people of the same area.   2000  ISTAT 
(2002c)  39,275  12,830 
PARPOLTG  People aged 14 and more talking about politics everyday 
for every 100 people of the same area.  2002  ISTAT 
(2004a)  8,465  1,567 
QUOTTG  People aged 11 and more reading newspapers everyday 
for every 100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2002c)  18,230  7,952 
QUOTTG  People aged 11 and more reading newspapers everyday 
for every 100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 
(2002c)  18,230  7,952 
SIQUOT  People aged 11 and more reading newspapers for every 
100 people of the same area.  2000  ISTAT 












































































































NOQUOT  1,00                                  
SIQUOT  -0,99  1,00                               
QUOTTG  -0,96  0,95  1,00                            
COMIZIO  0,66  -0,67  -0,61  1,00                         
CORTEO  0,25  -0,24  -0,21  0,64  1,00                      
DIBATT  -0,26  0,27  0,33  0,22  0,63  1,00                   
ATGRAPAR  0,22  -0,20  -0,18  0,56  0,45  0,28  1,00                
SOLDPAR  -0,49  0,47  0,45  -0,04  -0,04  0,55  0,13  1,00             
PARPOLTG  -0,48  0,49  0,54  -0,07  0,35  0,44  0,06  0,09  1,00          
NOPARPOL  0,86  -0,84  -0,82  0,50  0,11  -0,48  0,17  -0,61  -0,55  1,00       
INFOPOTG  -0,81  0,82  0,81  -0,56  -0,03  0,52  -0,01  0,42  0,54  -0,85  1,00    




Table A11. Italian regions ranking based on civic awareness 
Rank  Region  Factor scores  Contribution  Squared cosines 
1  Emilia Romagna  -3,68  10,15  0,83 
2  Trentino Alto Adige  -3,36  8,46  0,81 
3  Friuli Venezia Giulia  -3,20  7,70  0,83 
4  Toscana  -2,70  5,45  0,68 
5  Liguria  -2,49  4,65  0,69 
6  Veneto  -1,83  2,50  0,64 
7  Lazio  -1,82  2,47  0,59 
8  Lombardia  -1,25  1,17  0,51 
9  Valle d'Aosta  -1,04  0,81  0,16 
10  Sardegna  -1,00  0,76  0,40 
11  Piemonte  -0,88  0,58  0,29 
12  Marche  0,56  0,24  0,06 
13  Umbria  0,74  0,42  0,48 
14  Puglia  2,02  3,08  0,64 
15  Abruzzo  2,35  4,13  0,87 
16  Molise  2,41  4,35  0,53 
17  Sicilia  3,64  9,91  0,95 
18  Basilicata  3,75  10,55  0,94 
19  Calabria  3,80  10,82  0,90 
20  Campania  3,97  11,81  0,92   36 
Table A13. Factor loadings of active variables and factor-variables correlations resulting from the 
PCA on the entire dataset.  
Label variable  Axis  1  Axis  2  Axis  3  Axis  4  Axis  5 
NOQUOT  -0,89  -0,27  -0,10  -0,08  -0,22 
SIQUOT  0,90  0,27  0,12  0,11  0,19 
QUOTTG  0,85  0,22  0,08  0,14  0,34 
RIUASEC  0,55  -0,24  -0,12  0,34  -0,23 
RIUASCU  0,73  -0,26  0,30  -0,08  -0,17 
ORGANIZ  0,70  -0,50  0,25  -0,03  0,20 
ASSPORT  0,70  -0,18  0,29  -0,14  0,05 
COMIZIO  -0,62  -0,50  -0,27  0,34  -0,14 
CORTEO  -0,22  -0,19  -0,33  0,80  -0,03 
DIBATT  0,32  -0,27  -0,16  0,79  -0,04 
ATGRAPAR  -0,03  -0,74  -0,09  0,38  0,08 
SOLDPAR  0,49  -0,49  0,11  0,35  0,02 
SOLDASS  0,89  -0,24  0,16  0,26  0,02 
PARPOLTG  0,48  0,20  -0,53  0,44  -0,08 
NOPARPOL  -0,92  -0,07  0,06  -0,14  0,13 
INFOPOTG  0,95  0,01  0,05  0,25  -0,02 
NOINFOPO  -0,94  -0,10  -0,04  -0,13  0,09 
AMIATT  0,81  0,18  0,28  0,21  -0,09 
AMIVOL  0,80  0,24  0,39  -0,08  0,04 
NOPRARE  0,81  0,10  -0,20  0,30  0,20 
SIPRARE  -0,73  0,09  0,24  -0,18  -0,37 
INCAMI2S  0,34  -0,54  -0,18  -0,09  -0,37 
SODDPAR  0,77  0,11  0,09  0,28  0,28 
INCPARTG  -0,31  -0,16  0,38  -0,06  0,66 
NOINCPAR  0,67  0,48  0,14  -0,05  -0,12 
NOPARENT  0,53  0,12  -0,36  -0,07  0,36 
MUM1KM  -0,94  -0,12  0,22  0,14  0,06 
MUM16KM  0,93  -0,02  -0,19  -0,18  -0,01 
FIG1KM  -0,62  0,07  0,64  0,29  0,02 
FIG16KM  0,35  -0,41  -0,54  -0,51  -0,12 
GIOBAM2S  -0,36  0,40  0,58  0,30  0,28 
NOGIOBAM  0,85  0,04  -0,18  0,02  -0,18 
PARVIC2S  0,10  -0,69  0,31  -0,23  0,27 
NOPARVIC  -0,01  0,66  0,12  0,36  -0,15 
PARCON2S  0,79  -0,48  0,20  -0,09  0,01 
NOPARLCO  -0,62  0,46  0,20  0,04  -0,26 
CENAF2S  0,76  0,03  0,40  0,04  -0,31 
NOCENF  -0,86  -0,04  -0,13  0,21  0,18 
BAR2S  0,71  -0,46  0,40  -0,10  -0,05 
NOBAR  -0,71  0,38  -0,29  0,33  -0,05 
MUBAR  0,61  0,29  0,63  0,03  -0,22 
FAMSINGL  0,69  0,10  -0,48  -0,18  0,16 
FAM5COMP  -0,91  -0,04  0,29  0,10  -0,06 
COPPFIG  -0,91  0,01  0,26  0,07  0,00 
COPNOFIG  0,85  -0,14  -0,27  -0,11  -0,04 
FRATELTG  -0,78  -0,41  0,06  0,00  0,10 
VMUMTG  -0,80  -0,40  -0,05  0,05  0,05 
VFIGTG  -0,32  -0,59  0,42  0,29  -0,34 
CONTPAR  0,53  -0,39  0,39  -0,07  -0,07 
AIUTOVOL  0,28  0,17  0,05  -0,07  -0,64   37 
Annex B. Technical Notes 
 
I. Data Availability  
All data are available on the web for purposes of replication. Multipurpose surveys carried out by 
the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) can be downloaded from the ISTAT web site, at the 
address www.istat.it. Multivariate analyses have been performed using Decisia SPAD 5.6.0.  
 
II. Notes on § 4.1, Social capital as informal networks of strong family ties 
First ten eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on family social networks are presented in Table 1. 
Factor loadings and variables-factor correlations are reported in Table 2. They exhibit the same 



























The  correlation  circle  (Figure  1)  allows  an  intuitive  interpretation  of  the  first  factorial  plan’s 
meaning, and highlights the opposition between satisfaction for family relationships and propensity 
to  count  on  relatives  in  case  of  need,  on  the  one  side,  and indicators  of  spatial  proximity  and 
contacts frequency, on the other.  
 
Table 1. First 10 eigenvalues resulting from the 
PCA on the family social networks dataset 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  10,8159  60,09  60,09 
2  1,8413  10,23  70,32 
3  1,5601  8,67  78,99 
4  1,1280  6,27  85,25 
5  0,8243  4,58  89,83 
6  0,5596  3,11  92,94 
7  0,4202  2,33  95,27 
8  0,3508  1,95  97,22 
9  0,1523  0,85  98,07 
10  0,1218  0,68  98,75 
 
Table 2. Factor loadings and active 
variables-factors correlations 
Label  Axis 1  Axis 2 
SODDPAR  0,71  0,29 
INCPARTG  -0,43  -0,47 
NOINCPAR  0,66  0,43 
NOPARENT  0,60  -0,41 
MUM1KM  -0,98  -0,05 
MUM16KM  0,95  0,07 
FIG1KM  -0,82  0,46 
FIG16KM  0,66  -0,53 
GIOBAM2S  -0,75  0,18 
NOGIOBAM  0,87  0,10 
FAMSINGL  0,82  -0,16 
FAM5COMP  -0,97  0,05 
COPPFIG  -0,96  0,04 
COPNOFIG  0,90  -0,12 
FRATELTG  -0,83  -0,28 
VMUMTG  -0,79  -0,42 
VFIGTG  -0,50  0,35 
CONTPAR  0,36  0,47 




The  corresponding  scattergram  of  the  Italian  regions  is  presented  in  Figure  2.  The  horizontal 





III. Notes on § 4.2, Social capital as informal networks of weak ties 
Eigenvalues  resulting  from  the  PCA  on  informal  weak  ties  among  friends  and  neighboors  are 





















IV. Notes on § 4.3, Social capital as voluntary organizations 
Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on indicators of voluntary organizations are presented in Table 















Trentino Alto Adige has been treated as an outlier. Its absolute contribution to the first axis would 
otherwise have accounted for 53,74 percent, slightly influencing the structure of relations among 
variables.  
As pointed out in the paper, the PCA shows the complex nature of civil society, which reveals to be 
shaped at least by two major dimensions. The first one is represented by people propensity to carry 
out  light  forms  of  participation  to  civil  society,  like  joining  meetings  and  giving  money  to 
associations. The second one is given by people propensity to carry out volunteering activities “on 
the  field”,  with  the  aim  to  give  concrete  help  to  disadvantaged  people.  Such  a  dimension,  as 
Table 3. Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA 
on weak bridging ties 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
percentage 
1  5,8006  52,73  52,73 
2  2,3069  20,97  73,70 
3  0,8231  7,48  81,19 
4  0,6478  5,89  87,08 
5  0,5125  4,66  91,73 
6  0,4125  3,75  95,48 
7  0,2275  2,07  97,55 
8  0,1232  1,12  98,67 
9  0,0720  0,65  99,33 
10  0,0457  0,42  99,74 
11  0,0284  0,26  100,00 
 
Table 4. Loadings of active variables on 
Axis 1 and active variables-factors 
correlations 
Label variable  Axis  1 
ASSPORT  0,81 
INCAMI2S  0,49 
PARVIC2S  0,28 
NOPARVIC  -0,26 
PARCON2S  0,89 
NOPARLCO  -0,62 
CENAF2S  0,84 
NOCENF  -0,82 
BAR2S  0,94 
NOBAR  -0,89 
MUCENSOC  0,38 
MUBAR  0,72 
 
Table 9. Loadings of active variables and active 
variables correlations with the first factor 
Label variable  Axis  1 
RIUASEC  -0,70 
RIUASCU  -0,89 
ORGANIZ  -0,81 
SOLDASS  -0,93 
AMIVOL  -0,81 
AIUTOVOL  -0,35 
 
Table 8. Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on 
formal associations dataset 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  3,5713  59,52  59,52 
2  1,0182  16,97  76,49 
3  0,6485  10,81  87,30 
4  0,4025  6,71  94,01 
5  0,2820  4,70  98,71 
6  0,0775  1,29  100,00 
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expressed  by  the  variable  AIUTOVOL,  exhibits  a  weak  positive  correlation  with  all  the  other 
variables. It is of interest to rank the Italian regions also according to this more active form of social 
participation. The scattergram of the Italian regions given by the first factorial plan is therefore 




V. Notes on § 4.4  Social capital as active political participation 
Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on active political participation are presented in Table 12. 















In the PCA on indicators of voluntary organizations and active political participation, Trentino Alto 
Adige has been treated as an outlier, due to its contribution to the first axis equal to 54,4 percent. 
Eigenvalues are reported in Table 14. and the correlation matrix is reported in Table 15. Factor 
loadings and variables correlations with the first two axes are shown in Table 16. 
Table 12. Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on 
active political participation dataset 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  2,1351  53,38  53,38 
2  1,0785  26,96  80,34 
3  0,5341  13,35  93,69 
4  0,2523  6,31  100,00 
 
 
Table 13. Loadings of active variables and 
active variables-factors correlations  
Label variable  Axis  1  Axis  2 
COMIZIO  0,92  0,10 
CORTEO  0,81  0,13 
ATGRAPAR  0,80  -0,21 
SOLDPAR  -0,05  -0,98 
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Table 14. Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA 
on voluntary organizations and active political 
participation (10 variables) 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  4,0971  40,97  40,97 
2  2,5426  25,43  66,40 
3  1,2521  12,52  78,92 
4  0,6319  6,32  85,24 
5  0,5959  5,96  91,20 
6  0,3675  3,68  94,87 
7  0,2439  2,44  97,31 
8  0,1903  1,90  99,21 
9  0,0533  0,53  99,75 
10  0,0254  0,25  100,00 
 
Table 15. Factor loadings and variables-factors correlations 
resulting from the PCA on voluntary organizations and active 
political participation  (10 variables)  
Label variable  Axis  1  Axis  2 
RIUASEC  -0,61  0,41 
RIUASCU  -0,86  0,03 
ORGANIZ  -0,82  0,21 
COMIZIO  0,55  0,74 
CORTEO  0,21  0,74 
ATGRAPAR  -0,07  0,85 
SOLDPAR  -0,54  0,49 
SOLDASS  -0,94  0,21 
AMIVOL  -0,84  -0,37 
AIUTOVOL  -0,30  -0,30 
 
VI. Notes on § 4.5, Social capital as civic awareness 
Eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on indicators of civic awareness are reported in Table 17. 

















Table 18. Loadings of active variables  
and active variables correlations with the first 
factor 
Label variable  Axis  1 
NOQUOT  0,94 
SIQUOT  -0,94 
QUOTTG  -0,93 
DIBATT  -0,48 
PARPOLTG  -0,61 
NOPARPOL  0,94 
INFOPOTG  -0,93 
NOINFOPO  0,96 
AMIATT  -0,87 
 
Table 17. Eigenvalues resulting from  
the PCA on civic awareness 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  6,6657  74,06  74,06 
2  1,0278  11,42  85,48 
3  0,5967  6,63  92,11 
4  0,2883  3,20  95,32 
5  0,2212  2,46  97,77 
6  0,1400  1,56  99,33 
7  0,0466  0,52  99,85 
8  0,0101  0,11  99,96 
9  0,0036  0,04  100,00 
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VII. Notes on § 5. The empirical analysis on the entire dataset 
First ten eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on all of the five dimensions of social capital are 
reported in Table 19. 
 
 
Table 19. First ten eigenvalues resulting from  
the PCA on the entire dataset (58 variables) 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  23,9685  47,94  47,94 
2  5,5885  11,18  59,11 
3  4,4402  8,88  67,99 
4  3,4571  6,91  74,91 
5  2,4214  4,84  79,75 
6  2,1550  4,31  84,06 
7  1,5539  3,11  87,17 
8  1,2685  2,54  89,71 
9  1,1080  2,22  91,92 
10  0,8747  1,75  93,67 
 
 
The correlation circle (Figure 4) points out the positive correlation between weak informal ties (e.g. 
the habit to meet friends in contexts like sport circles, bars, and music clubs) and the linking ties of 
voluntary organizations. A strong correlation emerges also between strong family ties and a scarce 
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First ten eigenvalues resulting from the PCA on the four “structural” dimensions of social capital 
are reported in Table 20. Factor loadings and variables-factors correlations are reported in Table 21. 
 
 
Table 20. First ten eigenvalues resulting from 
the PCA on the four “structural” dimensions of 
social capital 
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
Percentage 
1  17,7481  44,37  44,37 
2  4,9872  12,47  56,84 
3  4,0549  10,14  66,98 
4  2,4260  6,07  73,04 
5  2,2100  5,52  78,57 
6  1,8315  4,58  83,14 
7  1,3949  3,49  86,63 
8  1,1235  2,81  89,44 
9  0,9067  2,27  91,71 




Table 21. Loadings of variables and variables’ correlations with the first three axes 
Label   Axis  1  Axis  2  Axis  3  Label  Axis 1  Axis 2  Axis 3 
RIUASEC  0,56  -0,18  -0,05  FIG16KM  0,45  -0,29  -0,61 
RIUASCU  0,75  -0,21  0,30  GIOBAM2S  -0,43  0,31  0,60 
ORGANIZ  0,74  -0,46  0,22  NOGIOBAM  0,85  0,16  -0,13 
ASSPORT  0,72  -0,13  0,27  PARVIC2S  0,19  -0,67  0,21 
COMIZIO  -0,58  -0,55  -0,27  NOPARVIC  -0,10  0,61  0,22 
CORTEO  -0,26  -0,23  -0,24  PARCON2S  0,83  -0,41  0,18 
ATGRAPAR  0,01  -0,77  -0,11  NOPARLCO  -0,65  0,39  0,24 
SOLDPAR  0,50  -0,47  0,12  CENAF2S  0,74  0,07  0,44 
SOLDASS  0,88  -0,18  0,20  NOCENF  -0,85  -0,11  -0,13 
AMIVOL  0,77  0,30  0,41  BAR2S  0,76  -0,40  0,38 
NOPRARE  0,77  0,17  -0,14  NOBAR  -0,76  0,33  -0,23 
SIPRARE  -0,72  0,03  0,21  MUBAR  0,57  0,30  0,69 
INCAMI2S  0,40  -0,50  -0,19  FAMSINGL  0,69  0,19  -0,47 
SODDPAR  0,74  0,17  0,14  FAM5COMP  -0,91  -0,15  0,28 
INCPARTG  -0,29  -0,23  0,31  COPPFIG  -0,92  -0,11  0,24 
NOINCPAR  0,64  0,57  0,21  COPNOFIG  0,88  -0,02  -0,27 
NOPARENT  0,52  0,19  -0,36  VMUMTG  -0,75  -0,46  -0,09 
MUM1KM  -0,94  -0,23  0,20  VFIGTG  -0,28  -0,65  0,42 
MUM16KM  0,94  0,08  -0,18  CONTPAR  0,57  -0,35  0,39 
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VII. Notes on § 6, In search of a single synthetic indicator of social capital: a multiple factor 
analysis 
First ten eigevalues resulting from the MFA on the four structural dimensions of social capital are 
reported in Table 22. Single variables coordinates on the first two axes are represented in Table 23. 
 
 
Table 22. First ten eigenvalues of the MFA run on the 
narrow dataset  
Number  Eigenvalue  Percentage  Cumulated 
percentage 
1  2,9229  39,8177  39,8177 
2  1,3385  18,2335  58,0511 
3  0,6222  8,4767  66,5278 
4  0,4926  6,7102  73,2380 
5  0,4383  5,9702  79,2082 
6  0,3352  4,5669  83,7751 
7  0,2658  3,6206  87,3957 
8  0,1939  2,6412  90,0368 
9  0,1642  2,2367  92,2736 
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Table 23. Coordinates and helps to the interprétation of the active variables                    
Coordinates  Contributions  Squared cosines 
Groups  Variables 
axis   1  axis   2  axis   1  axis   2  axis   1  axis   2 
                    
NOPRARE               0,7229  0,0564  1,8109  0,0241  0,5226  0,0032 
SIPRARE  -0,6551  -0,1719  1,4871  0,2237  0,4291  0,0296 
SODDPAR               0,7211  -0,0112  1,8019  0,0009  0,5200  0,0001 
INCPARTG  -0,2310  0,0830  0,1849  0,0522  0,0534  0,0069 
NOINCPAR  0,6386  -0,5114  1,4131  1,9795  0,4078  0,2616 
NOPARENT  0,4372  -0,0859  0,6624  0,0559  0,1911  0,0074 
MUM1KM  -0,8774  0,1345  2,6677  0,1370  0,7698  0,0181 
MUM16KM  0,8805  -0,0316  2,6865  0,0075  0,7752  0,0010 
FIG1KM  -0,5260  -0,0545  0,9587  0,0225  0,2767  0,0030 
FIG16KM  0,3283  0,2415  0,3735  0,4412  0,1078  0,0583 
GIOBAM2S  -0,2911  -0,3314  0,2937  0,8310  0,0848  0,1098 
NOGIOBAM  0,8042  -0,0323  2,2413  0,0079  0,6468  0,0010 
COPPFIG  -0,8619  0,0119  2,5744  0,0011  0,7429  0,0001 
COPNOFIG  0,8202  0,0962  2,3315  0,0701  0,6728  0,0093 
FRATELTG  -0,7213  0,3672  1,8030  1,0206  0,5203  0,1349 
VMUMTG  -0,7579  0,4064  1,9905  1,2499  0,5744  0,1652 
VFIGTG  -0,1673  0,5269  0,0970  2,1011  0,0280  0,2776 
Group  1  
Strong Family Ties 
(Normal PCA) 
CONTPAR  0,6090  0,2260  1,2852  0,3866  0,3709  0,0511 
                    
ASSPORT               0,7616  0,0570  3,2941  0,0404  0,5800  0,0033 
INCAMI2S             1,0000  0,3846  0,0908  0,8402  0,3121  0,1479 
NOINCAMI              0,6394  -0,4441  2,3222  2,4461  0,4089  0,1972 
PARVIC2S               0,2678  0,4174  0,4073  2,1609  0,0717  0,1742 
NOPARVIC              -0,1055  -0,3967  0,0632  1,9523  0,0111  0,1574 
PARCON2S              0,8475  0,3478  4,0797  1,5003  0,7183  0,1210 
NOPARLCO              -0,5987  -0,3977  2,0357  1,9622  0,3584  0,1582 
CENAF2S               0,8057  -0,0789  3,6872  0,0772  0,6492  0,0062 
NOCENF                -0,8703  0,1601  4,3016  0,3177  0,7573  0,0256 
BAR2S                  0,8137  0,2992  3,7602  1,1104  0,6620  0,0895 
NOBAR                 -0,7888  -0,1532  3,5341  0,2911  0,6222  0,0235 




MUBAR                 0,6748  -0,3507  2,5861  1,5259  0,4553  0,1230 
                    
RIUASEC               0,5223  0,3583  2,6132  2,6857  0,2728  0,1284 
RIUASCU               0,7980  0,1231  6,1009  0,3168  0,6369  0,0151 
ORGANIZ            0,7737  0,3625  5,7353  2,7496  0,5987  0,1314 
SOLDASS               0,9033  0,2696  7,8168  1,5201  0,8160  0,0727 
AMIVOL                0,8373  -0,3254  6,7169  2,2156  0,7011  0,1059 




AIUTOVOL              0,2880  -0,2606  0,7949  1,4208  0,0830  0,0679 
                    
COMIZIO               -0,6396  0,6725  6,4575  15,5883  0,4092  0,4523 
CORTEO                -0,3296  0,5634  1,7147  10,9398  0,1086  0,3174 
ATGRAPAR              -0,0138  0,8900  0,0030  27,3002  0,0002  0,7921 




SOLDPAR  0,5323  0,5544  4,4720  10,5924  0,2833  0,3073 
 
 